• <button id="p9rp4"></button>
    1. <progress id="p9rp4"></progress>

    2. <em id="p9rp4"><object id="p9rp4"><input id="p9rp4"></input></object></em>
        <rp id="p9rp4"><object id="p9rp4"><input id="p9rp4"></input></object></rp><em id="p9rp4"></em>

          <button id="p9rp4"></button>


          Add:No. 5-1426 Weima Plaza, No.2 Gaopan

          Road,Chengdu City,Sichuan,CP.R. China



          Sichuan Giant Chemical Technology Co., Ltd    Tel:0086-28-85293317 Fax:0086-28-85293217   蜀ICP備11026201號    Power by 300.cn


          Interpretation of Criteria for Hidden Dangers of Major Chemical Production Safety Accidents

          2018/04/25 16:37
          To accurately determine, promptly rectify hidden major production safety accidents (hereinafter referred to as major hidden dangers) in chemical and hazardous chemicals production and operation units,

            To accurately determine, promptly rectify hidden major production safety accidents (hereinafter referred to as major hidden dangers) in chemical and hazardous chemicals production and operation units, and effectively prevent and prevent major accidents, according to the "Safe Production Act" and "The CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Promoting Safety Production Reform Development Opinions: The State Administration of Safety Supervision has formulated and issued the Criteria for Judging Hidden Risks of Major Production Safety Accidents in Production and Business Units of Chemicals and Hazardous Chemicals (Trial) (hereinafter referred to as “Determination Criteria”). Based on relevant laws and regulations, departmental rules, and national standards, the Judgment Standard draws lessons from the major and typical accidents of chemical and hazardous chemicals in recent years. Twenty types are listed in terms of personnel requirements, facilities, and safety management. Major accidents hidden. In order to further clarify the connotation and basis of each case of the “determination standard”, it is convenient for the relevant enterprises and safety regulatory departments to apply and standardize the “judgment standard” to effectively implement, and the current article is briefly explained as follows:

            I. The principal responsible persons and production safety management personnel of hazardous chemical production and business units have not passed the examination according to law.

            In recent years, during the investigation of chemical (hazardous chemicals) accidents, it has been found that there are weak awareness of legal awareness and safety risks among key personnel and safety management personnel in different levels of accidents, lack of knowledge about safety production management, and safety production management capabilities that cannot meet safety requirements. Production needs to wait for common problems, and human factors are the most important factors that restrict the safety production of chemical (dangerous chemicals). The safe production of dangerous chemicals is a scientific and highly professional work. Only the principal responsible persons and safety production management personnel of enterprises can firmly establish the awareness of safety red line and risk awareness, and master the basic knowledge of safe production of dangerous chemicals and have safety. The basic skills of production management can truly implement the company's main responsibility for safe production.

            The "Safety Production Law," "Safety Management Regulations for Hazardous Chemicals," and "Safety Training Regulations for Production and Business Operations Units" (Order No. 3 of the State Administration of Safety Supervision) have all clearly defined the training and evaluation of employees in hazardous chemical production and business units. The requirements, including Article 24 of the "Safety Production Law," require that "the principal person in charge of the production and business operation unit and the safety production management personnel must possess the safety production knowledge and management capabilities corresponding to the production and business activities undertaken by the unit. Dangerous goods The main responsible persons and production safety management personnel of production, operation and storage units and mines, metal smelting, construction and road transportation units shall be responsible for the assessment of safe production knowledge and management capabilities of the competent department in charge of safety production supervision and management. Qualified. Assessment may not be charged." The "Provisions for the Safety Training of Production and Business Units" clearly require that "the principal responsible person of production and business units for hazardous chemicals and safety production management personnel must, within six months from the date of their duties, must be responsible for the safe production of safety production supervision and supervision departments. Management ability passed the assessment." On January 25, 2017, the State Administration of Safety Supervision printed and issued the key assessment contents (first edition) of safety production management knowledge for key persons in charge of chemical (hazardous chemical) companies and the safety production management personnel of chemical (hazardous chemicals) enterprises. "Safety Production Management Knowledge Key Assessment Contents (First Edition)" (Sinoiss Receipt No. 15 (2017) of the State Administration of Safety Supervision and Administration of the People's Republic of China) puts forward clear requirements for the key assessments of key personnel and safety management personnel of relevant enterprises, and has supervision over production safety. The management department shall assess relevant personnel in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.

            Second, special operators did not hold certificates.

            The safety risks of special jobs are relatively large, and require higher professional skills. In recent years, due to the accidents caused by untrained and unqualified personnel in special operations posts, the “5?13” chlorine poisoning accident in Hebei Cangzhou in 2017 and the “6?5” major explosion accident in Linyi, Shandong Province occurred in The “7?2” explosion accident in Jiujiang, Jiangxi province revealed the problem of unlicensed staff in special operations and the lack of professional competence of personnel caused accidents.

            The "Safety Production Law" and "Administrative Regulations on the Examination and Administration of Safety Training for Special Operations Personnel" (Order No. 30 of the State Administration of Safety Supervision) all set clear requirements for the training and qualification of special operators, such as hazardous chemicals special operators. Have high school or equivalent to high school and above education. According to the regulations, the special operations involved in chemical and hazardous chemicals production and operation units include general-purpose operation types such as electrician work, welding and thermal cutting operations, and high altitude operations, as well as hazardous chemical process operations and chemical automation control instrument installations. , maintenance, and maintenance operations (including phosgene and phosgenation processes, chloralkali electrolysis process, chlorination process, nitrification process, ammonia synthesis process, cracking [cracking] process, fluorination process, hydrogenation process, diazotization process, oxidation process , Peroxide process, amination process, sulfonation process, polymerization process, alkylation process and other 15 kinds of dangerous process operations, and chemical automation control instrument installation, maintenance, maintenance). Personnel engaged in the above operations must undergo training assessment to obtain a special operation certificate. Uncertified posts should be included in major accident hazards.

            3. The external safety protection distances of production facilities and storage facilities involving “two important and one important” do not meet the requirements of national standards.

            The main purpose of this article is to require relevant units to set external safety protection distances as buffer distances in accordance with regulations and standards, so as to prevent major personnel casualties and property losses in the event of fire, explosion, and poison gas leakage in the production facilities and storage facilities of hazardous chemicals. The distance of external security protection is neither the distance between fire prevention nor the distance of health protection. It should be scientifically defined on the basis of the types, quantities, personal and socially acceptable risk standards for dangerous chemicals.

            Setting external protection distances is a common practice in international risk management and control. In May 2014, the State Administration of Safety Supervision issued Notice No. 13 “Individual Acceptable Risk Criteria for the Production and Storage of Hazardous Chemicals and Socially Acceptable Risk Standards (Trial)” to clarify the establishment and renovation of land-based hazardous chemicals companies. Standards for external safety protection distances for extensions and in-service production and storage installations. At the same time, standards such as "Code for Designing Fire Protection of Petrochemical Enterprises" (GB50160-2008) and "Code for Design of Building Fire Protection" (GB50016-2014) have requirements for the external distances of production devices, storage facilities and other buildings, and involve "two key points. Major production facilities and storage facilities should also meet their requirements. In 2009, the safety distance between the Henan “7?15” explosion accidents and neighboring residential areas was seriously insufficient. The accident caused 8 deaths, 8 serious injuries, and 108 surrounding residents were scratched by blasting glass shattered by blast waves.

            4. The equipment involved in the supervision of hazardous chemical processes did not implement automatic control. The system did not implement an emergency shutdown function. The equipment's automatic control system and emergency stop system were not put into use.

            “Implementation Measures for Safety Production Licenses of Hazardous Chemicals Production Enterprises” (State Administration of Safety Supervision, Decree No. 41) requirements, “Automation control systems for installations involving hazardous chemical processes and for the supervision of hazardous chemicals; large-scale processes involving hazardous chemicals The chemical plant is equipped with an emergency parking system." In recent years, companies involving the supervision of hazardous chemical processes have adopted automated control systems and emergency stop systems to reduce the number of operators in high-risk areas such as installation areas and to increase the intrinsic safety level of production facilities. However, there are still some companies involved in the supervision of hazardous chemical processes that do not implement automatic control and emergency stop functions as required, or have set up automatic control and emergency stop systems but are not normally put into use. On December 9, 2017, an explosion accident occurred between the dichlorobenzene production facilities of Lixin Biotechnology Co., Ltd., Lianyungang City, Jiangsu Province, resulting in the collapse of the fourth workshop and the adjacent six workshops where the accident device was located, resulting in a total of 10 deaths. Injury to people, the low level of automated control of accident devices, and the large number of on-site workers are important causes of heavy casualties.

            5. The dangerous chemicals tanks that constitute the primary and secondary major hazard sources have not realized the emergency shutdown function; the hazardous chemical tanks that involve the primary and secondary major hazard sources of toxic gases, liquefied gases and highly toxic liquids are not equipped Independent safety instrument system.

            Provisional Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of Major Hazardous Sources of Hazardous Chemicals (Order No. 40 of the State Administration of Safety Supervision) requires that “primary or secondary major hazard sources, equipment emergency stop systems” and “toxic gases, liquefied gases, and highly toxic substances be involved” The primary or secondary major hazards of the liquid, equipped with an independent safety instrument system." The hazardous chemical tanks that constitute the primary and secondary major hazard sources have serious consequences because of the serious accidents. All storage tanks should be provided with an emergency shutdown system to achieve emergency shutdown. If an emergency shutdown is performed on a storage tank directly connected to an upstream production facility, abnormal conditions such as overpressure of the production unit may be caused. Emergency shutdown can be achieved by setting an emergency switching method to prevent the tank from causing excessive levels and overpressure. . On July 16, 2010, the crude oil storage pipeline of Dalian PetroChina International Storage & Transportation Company exploded. It caused a large fire and caused a large amount of crude oil to leak. The accident resulted in one death and one injury. The direct economic loss was 223,309,900 yuan. The important reason for the escalation of the accident was that no emergency cutoff system was installed in the crude oil storage tank where the leakage occurred. Crude oil continued to flow out of the storage tank and could not be cut off urgently, resulting in an increase in fire. On January 7, 2010, a fire and explosion accident occurred in the 316# tank area of ??the Synthetic Rubber Plant of Lanzhou Petrochemical Company, which caused six deaths, one serious injury, and five minor injuries. As the carbon 4 material leaked, the vaporization in the fire protection dike diffused, and personnel could not Close to the bottom valve, and the accidental tank is not equipped with an emergency cutoff system, resulting in a large amount of material leakage.

            Sixth, full-pressure liquefied hydrocarbon storage tanks are not set according to national standards water injection measures.

            When a full-pressure type storage tank leaks, water is injected into the storage tank to raise the liquid surface of the liquefied hydrocarbon, and the leakage point is placed under the water surface, which can reduce or prevent the leakage of the liquefied hydrocarbon, and eliminate the accident in the bud. On March 5, 1998, the liquefied gas storage tank of the Xi'an Gas Company liquefied gas storage tank exploded after a fire and caused 12 deaths. The main reason was that the upper flange of the sewage valve of the 400m3 ball valve failed to seal and failed to fire. . The requirements of 6.3.16 of the "Code for Design of Fire Protection for Petrochemical Enterprises" (GB50160-2008) states that "full-pressure type storage tanks shall adopt water injection measures to prevent leakage of liquefied hydrocarbons". Requirements for Safety Design Specification for Spherical Tanks for Liquefied Hydrocarbons (SH3136-2003) (Section 7.4), "Plastic, Propane, Mixed C4, Surplus C4, and LPG Spherical Tanks should be equipped with water injection facilities".

            The setting of water injection measures for full-pressure liquefied hydrocarbon storage tanks should go through formal design, construction and acceptance procedures. The design of water injection measures should be based on the principle of safety, rapid and effective, and strong operability, and set up remote control valves with manual functions, in line with the relevant national standards. The liquefied hydrocarbon storage tanks required to install water injection facilities are mainly normal-temperature full-pressure liquefied hydrocarbon storage tanks, semi-refrigerating pressure type liquefied hydrocarbon storage tanks (such as ethylene), and liquid hydrocarbons (such as methyl chloride) tanks that react with water in part. You can not set water injection measures. In addition, the set water injection measures should ensure sufficient water sources for water injection, meet the requirements for water injection under emergency conditions, and give full play to the role of water injection measures.

            Seventh, filling of liquefied hydrocarbons, liquid ammonia, liquid chlorine and other inflammable and explosive, toxic and hazardous liquefied gas is not using universal pipe filling system.

            Liquefied hydrocarbons, liquid ammonia, liquid chlorine and other flammable and explosive, toxic and hazardous liquefied gas filling safety risks, once the leak easily lead to accidents such as explosion burning, personnel poisoning. Universal pipe filling system has flexible rotation, high sealing reliability, low electrostatic hazard, long service life, safety performance is much higher than the metal hose, and convenient operation and use, can effectively reduce the flammable hydrocarbon, liquid ammonia, liquid chlorine and other flammable The safety risk of explosive, toxic and hazardous liquefied gas filling.

            “Guiding Opinions on Further Strengthening the Safety Production of Hazardous Chemicals” by the Office of the Security Council of the State Council (ZSCO (2008) No. 26) and the State Administration of Safety Supervision, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology “On the Implementation of Hazardous Chemical Enterprises” The "Implementation Opinions on Further Strengthening Safety Production Work of Enterprises" (Safety Supervision Administration No. 3 [2010] No. 186) all require the use of metal universal pipe filling systems instead of filling hoses in the filling of dangerous chemicals. It is forbidden to use hoses to fill liquefied dangerous chemicals such as liquid chlorine, liquid ammonia, liquefied petroleum gas, and liquefied natural gas. The "Code for Designing Fire Protection of Petrochemical Enterprises" (GB50160-2008) imposes higher requirements on the handling of liquefied hydrocarbons and flammable liquids. The sixth paragraph of Article 6.4.2 stipulates that "Type A, Type B, Type A, and Type A liquids must be mandatory." The loading and unloading trucks should use submerged loading and unloading trucks and cranes. Article 6.4.3 stipulates that “1. Liquefied hydrocarbons (ie Class A flammable liquids) are strictly forbidden to be discharged on site; 2. Low temperature liquefied hydrocarbon handling cranes should be set separately”. On September 18, 2015, a chemical ammonia leak occurred in Henan Zhonghong Coal Chemical Company, causing poisoning to some villagers near the factory. The cause of the accident was the leakage of ammonia gas from the explosion of the metal hose at the bottom of the ammonia tower in the chemical plant of Zhonghong Coal Chemical Company.

            8. Poison gas, chlorine gas and other highly toxic gases and hydrogen sulfide gas pipelines pass through public areas other than plant sites (including chemical parks and industrial parks).

            The “Regulations on the Safety Management of Hazardous Chemicals Pipelines” (SAWS Order No. 43) requires that phosgene, chlorine, and other highly toxic chemicals be prohibited from crossing (passing through) public areas and strictly control ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, and other toxicants. Dangerous chemicals in gas pipelines wear (cross) more common areas.

            With the rapid development of China's economy, the process of urbanization is accelerating, and some dangerous chemical pipelines have been surrounded by newly built residents and commercial areas from the original remote suburbs. Once a toxic gas pipeline passes through the public area, it leaks. It will pose a great threat to the lives of the surrounding residents. At the same time, chlorine gas, phosgene, and hydrogen sulfide have higher densities than air and are highly corrosive. They can both corrode equipment and cause corrosion failure of equipment and pipelines. Once a leak occurs, it is easy to cause a serious accident. For example, in 2004, the “4?16” chlorine leakage and explosion accident occurred in the Chongqing Tianyuan Chemical Plant. The reason was that the equipment was corroded and perforated for a long time, and the liquid chlorine tank exploded. As a result, the chlorine gas leaked and the explosion continued during the accident. Nine people were killed, three were injured and 150,000 were evacuated.

            9. The regional overhead power lines cross the production area and do not meet the requirements of the national standards.

            The area overhead power line voltage level is generally 35KV or more. If it crosses the production area, accidents such as rod break, wire breakage, or wire ignition may affect production and cause fire, causing casualties and property losses. On the contrary, once a fire or explosion accident occurs in the production plant area, there is also a threat to overhead power lines. The national standards involved in this article refer to the "Code for the Fire Protection Design of Petrochemicals" (GB50160-2008) and the "Code for the Fire Protection of Building Facilities" (GB50016-2014). Among them, Article 4.1.6 of the "Code for the Prevention of Fire and Design of Petrochemical Design" requires that "a regional overhead power line is strictly prohibited from passing through the production area." Therefore, petrochemical enterprises and other chemical and hazardous chemical products designed and manufactured in accordance with the "Code for the Design of Fire Protection Requirements for Petrochemical Industry" Units are strictly prohibited regional overhead power lines through the production and storage areas. Other chemicals and dangers